fixes #1083 Random number improvements

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 88 deletions

diff --git a/src/platform/posix/posix_rand.c b/src/platform/posix/posix_rand.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 2b704e2f..00000000
--- a/src/platform/posix/posix_rand.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-//
-// Copyright 2018 Staysail Systems, Inc. <info@staysail.tech>
-// Copyright 2018 Capitar IT Group BV <info@capitar.com>
-//
-// This software is supplied under the terms of the MIT License, a
-// copy of which should be located in the distribution where this
-// file was obtained (LICENSE.txt).  A copy of the license may also be
-// found online at https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT.
-//
-
-// POSIX clock stuff.
-#include "core/nng_impl.h"
-
-#ifdef NNG_PLATFORM_POSIX
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/utsname.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#if defined(NNG_USE_GETRANDOM)
-#include <linux/random.h>
-#elif defined(NNG_USE_GETENTROPY)
-#include <sys/random.h>
-#endif
-
-// This structure represents the very barest minimum that we can use as
-// a source of entropy.  We mix these into our initial entropy, but really
-// really really you want to have more data than this available, especially
-// for cryptographic applications.
-struct nni_plat_prng_x {
-	nni_time       now;
-	pid_t          pid;
-	uid_t          uid;
-	struct utsname uts;
-};
-
-void
-nni_plat_seed_prng(void *buf, size_t bufsz)
-{
-	struct nni_plat_prng_x x;
-	size_t                 i;
-
-	memset(buf, 0, bufsz);
-
-#if defined(NNG_USE_GETRANDOM)
-	// Latest Linux has a nice API here.
-	(void) getrandom(buf, bufsz, 0);
-#elif defined(NNG_USE_GETENTROPY)
-	// Modern BSD systems prefer this, but can only generate 256 bytes
-	(void) getentropy(buf, bufsz > 256 ? 256 : 0);
-#elif defined(NNG_USE_ARC4RANDOM)
-	// This uses BSD style pRNG seeded from the kernel in libc.
-	(void) arc4random_buf(buf, bufsz);
-#elif defined(NNG_USE_DEVURANDOM)
-	// The historic /dev/urandom device.  This is not as a good as
-	// a system call, since file descriptor attacks are possible,
-	// and it may need special permissions.  We choose /dev/urandom
-	// over /dev/random to avoid diminishing the system entropy.
-	int fd;
-
-	if ((fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY)) >= 0) {
-		(void) read(fd, buf, bufsz);
-		(void) close(fd);
-	}
-#endif
-
-	// As a special extra guard, let's mixin the data from the
-	// following system calls.  This ensures that even on the most
-	// limited of systems, we have at least *some* level of randomness.
-	// The mixing is done in a way to avoid diminishing entropy we may
-	// have already collected.
-	memset(&x, 0, sizeof(x)); // satisfy valgrind
-	x.now = nni_clock();
-	x.pid = getpid();
-	x.uid = getuid();
-	uname(&x.uts);
-
-	for (i = 0; (i < bufsz) && (i < sizeof(x)); i++) {
-		((uint8_t *) buf)[i] ^= ((uint8_t *) &x)[i];
-	}
-}
-
-#endif // NNG_PLATFORM_POSIX