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authorGarrett D'Amore <garrett@damore.org>2018-01-11 14:58:09 -0800
committerGarrett D'Amore <garrett@damore.org>2018-01-16 08:45:11 -0800
commitbbf012364d9f1482b16c97b8bfd2fd07130446ca (patch)
tree2cb45903b0d5aa756d44f27b39a99c318a99a9a2 /src/supplemental/tls/mbedtls
parent18229bbb69423d64d0a1b98bcf4bf3e24fba3aa4 (diff)
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fixes #201 TLS configuration should support files for certificates and keys
This adds support for configuration of TLS websockets using the files for keys, certificates, and CRLs. Significant changes to the websocket, TLS, and HTTP layers were made here. We now expect TLS configuration to be tied to the HTTP layer, and the HTTP code creates default configuration objects based on the URL supplied. (HTTP dialers and listeners are now created with a URL rather than a sockaddr, giving them access to the scheme as well.) We fixed several bugs affecting TLS validation, and added a test suite that confirms that validation works as it should. We also fixed an orphaned socket during HTTP negotiation, responsible for an occasional assertion error if the http handshake does not complete successfully. Finally several use-after-free races were closed. TLS layer changes include reporting of handshake failures using newly created "standard" error codes for peer authentication and cryptographic failures. The use of the '*' wild card in URLs at bind time is no longer supported for websocket at least. Documentation updates for all this are in place as well.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/supplemental/tls/mbedtls')
-rw-r--r--src/supplemental/tls/mbedtls/tls.c132
1 files changed, 107 insertions, 25 deletions
diff --git a/src/supplemental/tls/mbedtls/tls.c b/src/supplemental/tls/mbedtls/tls.c
index c37d3d13..4e846f98 100644
--- a/src/supplemental/tls/mbedtls/tls.c
+++ b/src/supplemental/tls/mbedtls/tls.c
@@ -92,8 +92,6 @@ struct nng_tls_config {
#endif
mbedtls_x509_crt ca_certs;
mbedtls_x509_crl crl;
- bool have_ca_certs;
- bool have_crl;
int refcnt; // servers increment the reference
@@ -275,27 +273,33 @@ nni_tls_fini(nni_tls *tp)
NNI_FREE_STRUCT(tp);
}
-void
-nni_tls_strerror(int errnum, char *buf, size_t sz)
-{
- if (errnum & NNG_ETRANERR) {
- errnum &= ~NNG_ETRANERR;
- errnum = -errnum;
-
- mbedtls_strerror(errnum, buf, sz);
- } else {
- (void) snprintf(buf, sz, "%s", nng_strerror(errnum));
- }
-}
-
// nni_tls_mkerr converts an mbed error to an NNG error. In all cases
// we just encode with NNG_ETRANERR.
+static struct {
+ int tls;
+ int nng;
+} nni_tls_errs[] = {
+ { MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, NNG_EPEERAUTH },
+ { MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED, NNG_EPEERAUTH },
+ { MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED, NNG_EPEERAUTH },
+ { MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE, NNG_EPEERAUTH },
+ { MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY, NNG_ECONNREFUSED },
+ { MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED, NNG_ENOMEM },
+ { MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT, NNG_ETIMEDOUT },
+ { MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF, NNG_ECLOSED },
+ // terminator
+ { 0, 0 },
+};
+
static int
nni_tls_mkerr(int err)
{
- err = -err;
- err |= NNG_ETRANERR;
- return (err);
+ for (int i = 0; nni_tls_errs[i].tls != 0; i++) {
+ if (nni_tls_errs[i].tls == err) {
+ return (nni_tls_errs[i].nng);
+ }
+ }
+ return (NNG_ECRYPTO);
}
int
@@ -370,6 +374,23 @@ nni_tls_cancel(nni_aio *aio, int rv)
nni_mtx_unlock(&tp->lk);
}
+static void
+nni_tls_fail(nni_tls *tp, int rv)
+{
+ nni_aio *aio;
+ tp->tls_closed = true;
+ nni_plat_tcp_pipe_close(tp->tcp);
+ tp->tcp_closed = true;
+ while ((aio = nni_list_first(&tp->recvs)) != NULL) {
+ nni_list_remove(&tp->recvs, aio);
+ nni_aio_finish_error(aio, rv);
+ }
+ while ((aio = nni_list_first(&tp->sends)) != NULL) {
+ nni_list_remove(&tp->recvs, aio);
+ nni_aio_finish_error(aio, rv);
+ }
+}
+
// nni_tls_send_cb is called when the underlying TCP send completes.
static void
nni_tls_send_cb(void *ctx)
@@ -602,11 +623,8 @@ nni_tls_do_handshake(nni_tls *tp)
return;
default:
- // Some other error occurred... would be nice to be
- // able to diagnose it better.
- tp->tls_closed = true;
- nni_plat_tcp_pipe_close(tp->tcp);
- tp->tcp_closed = true;
+ // some other error occurred, this causes us to tear it down
+ nni_tls_fail(tp, nni_tls_mkerr(rv));
}
}
@@ -723,7 +741,6 @@ nni_tls_close(nni_tls *tp)
(void) mbedtls_ssl_close_notify(&tp->ctx);
} else {
nni_plat_tcp_pipe_close(tp->tcp);
- tp->tcp_closed = true;
}
nni_mtx_unlock(&tp->lk);
}
@@ -817,8 +834,10 @@ nng_tls_config_ca_chain(
rv = nni_tls_mkerr(rv);
goto err;
}
- cfg->have_crl = true;
}
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(&cfg->cfg_ctx, &cfg->ca_certs, &cfg->crl);
+
err:
nni_mtx_unlock(&cfg->lk);
return (rv);
@@ -881,6 +900,69 @@ err:
}
int
+nng_tls_config_ca_file(nng_tls_config *cfg, const char *path)
+{
+ int rv;
+ void * fdata;
+ size_t fsize;
+ char * pem;
+ // Note that while mbedTLS supports its own file methods, we want
+ // to avoid depending on that because it might not have been
+ // included, so we use our own. We have to read the file, and
+ // then allocate a buffer that has an extra byte so we can
+ // ensure NUL termination. The file named by path may contain
+ // both a ca chain, and crl chain, or just a ca chain.
+ if ((rv = nni_file_get(path, &fdata, &fsize)) != 0) {
+ return (rv);
+ }
+ if ((pem = nni_alloc(fsize + 1)) == NULL) {
+ nni_free(fdata, fsize);
+ return (NNG_ENOMEM);
+ }
+ memcpy(pem, fdata, fsize);
+ pem[fsize] = '\0';
+ nni_free(fdata, fsize);
+ if (strstr(pem, "-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----") != NULL) {
+ rv = nng_tls_config_ca_chain(cfg, pem, pem);
+ } else {
+ rv = nng_tls_config_ca_chain(cfg, pem, NULL);
+ }
+ nni_free(pem, fsize + 1);
+ return (rv);
+}
+
+int
+nng_tls_config_cert_key_file(
+ nng_tls_config *cfg, const char *path, const char *pass)
+{
+ int rv;
+ void * fdata;
+ size_t fsize;
+ char * pem;
+
+ // Note that while mbedTLS supports its own file methods, we want
+ // to avoid depending on that because it might not have been
+ // included, so we use our own. We have to read the file, and
+ // then allocate a buffer that has an extra byte so we can
+ // ensure NUL termination. The file named by path must contain
+ // both our certificate, and our private key. The password
+ // may be NULL if the key is not encrypted.
+ if ((rv = nni_file_get(path, &fdata, &fsize)) != 0) {
+ return (rv);
+ }
+ if ((pem = nni_alloc(fsize + 1)) == NULL) {
+ nni_free(fdata, fsize);
+ return (NNG_ENOMEM);
+ }
+ memcpy(pem, fdata, fsize);
+ pem[fsize] = '\0';
+ nni_free(fdata, fsize);
+ rv = nng_tls_config_own_cert(cfg, pem, pem, pass);
+ nni_free(pem, fsize + 1);
+ return (rv);
+}
+
+int
nng_tls_config_alloc(nng_tls_config **cfgp, nng_tls_mode mode)
{
return (nni_tls_config_init(cfgp, mode));